CHI '89 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Text as mask: gender, play, and performance on the Internet
Cybersociety 2.0
The Influence of Social Dependencies on Decision-Making: Initial Investigations with a New Game
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Adapting to agents' personalities in negotiation
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Learning social preferences in games
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Facing the challenge of human-agent negotiations via effective general opponent modeling
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Agent decision-making in open mixed networks
Artificial Intelligence
Human-agent teamwork in dynamic environments
Computers in Human Behavior
Computers work for women: Gender differences in e-supported divorce mediation
Computers in Human Behavior
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This paper examines the existence of gender differences in computer mediated (CM) negotiations where ''gender differences'' refers to the differential patterns of behavior of males and females proposed by Rubin and Brown (Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). Bargainers as individuals. In The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation (pp. 157-196). New York: Academic Press). Namely, males are more profit oriented and females are more relationship oriented. External manipulations encouraging cooperativeness with other negotiators either by profitable or social incentives were inserted in the negotiations performed within the Colored Trails (CT) game framework. The negotiators included 27 females and 33 males who negotiated in foursomes via computers. In the first study we focused on independent negotiators whose success was not crucially dependent on the other party. In the second study negotiators were dependent upon one another, encouraging integrative solutions. The findings reveal that the social incentive (team factor) positively affected the females' cooperativeness in contrast to males who were slightly less cooperative. On the other hand, profitable incentive influenced the males' cooperativeness level, while no change was shown by females, which is consistent with Rubin and Brown's distinction. These tendencies were reduced when playing with a non-reciprocal simulated agent. The causes for gender differences in CM as well as in face-to-face (FTF) negotiations are discussed.