Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Mutual Information Based Side Channel Analysis
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Countering early evaluation: an approach towards robust dual-rail precharge logic
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
The effectiveness of a current flattening circuit as countermeasure against DPA attacks
Microelectronics Journal
Theoretical and practical aspects of mutual information-based side channel analysis
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
On side-channel resistant block cipher usage
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
Exploiting dual-output programmable blocks to balance secure dual-rail logics
International Journal of Reconfigurable Computing - Special issue on selected papers from ReconFig 2009 International conference on reconfigurable computing and FPGAs (ReconFig 2009)
First principal components analysis: a new side channel distinguisher
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Power Analysis Attack Resistance Engineering by Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
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Power-constant logic styles are promising solutions to counter-act side-channel attacks on sensitive cryptographic devices. Recently, one vulnerability has been identified in a standard-cell based power-constant logic called WDDL. Another logic, nicknamed SecLib, is considered and does not present the flaw of WDDL. In this paper, we evaluate the security level of WDDL and SecLib. The methodology consists in embedding in a dedicated circuit one unprotected DES co-processor along with two others, implemented in WDDL and in SecLib. One essential part of this article is to describe the conception of the cryptographic ASIC, devised to foster side-channel cryptanalyses, in a view to model the strongest possible attacker. The same analyses are carried out successively on the three DES modules. We conclude that, provided the backend of the WDDL module is carefully designed, its vulnerability cannot be exploited by the state-of-the-art attacks. Similarly, the SecLib DES module resists all assaults. However, using a principal component analysis, we show that WDDL is more vulnerable than SecLib. The statistical dispersion of WDDL, that reflects the correlation between the secrets and the power dissipation, is proved to be an order of magnitude higher than that of SecLib.