Control in Internal and Outsourced Software Projects
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
System Design Features and Repeated Use of Electronic Data Exchanges
Journal of Management Information Systems
Determinants of relationship quality for IS/IT outsourcing success in public sector
Information Systems Frontiers
Relationship, contract and IT outsourcing success: Evidence from two descriptive case studies
Decision Support Systems
Information and Management
International Journal of Business Information Systems
Impact of Vendor Selection on Firms' IT Outsourcing: The Korea Experience
Journal of Global Information Management
Hybrid Relational-Contractual Governance for Business Process Outsourcing
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contract Performance in Offshore Systems Development: Role of Control Mechanisms
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Global Information Management
Journal of Global Information Management
Information Technology Management Practice: Impacts upon Effectiveness
Journal of Organizational and End User Computing
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Client control over the vendor has been identified as a critical factor in successfully managing information technology outsourcing relationships. Though prior studies have suggested that “how much” control is exercised has significant ramifications for individuals and firms, relatively few studies have operationalized and studied this important concept. In this study, we define the amount of formal control as the variety of mechanisms used by a client to exercise control over a vendor and the extent to which the mechanisms are used. We use literature on transaction cost economics and organizational control to build a model of the antecedents of the amount of formal control. The study uses data from 138 client-vendor matched pairs working in eight large, long-term, ongoing outsourcing arrangements to test specific hypotheses. The results suggest that clients who have technical or relationship management knowledge, or have high levels of trust in their vendors, use formal control mechanisms to a lesser extent. On the other hand, task uncertainty was found to be positively associated with the amount of formal control, and the degree of core competency involved in the outsourced activity was not found to be related to the amount of formal control. These results are discussed, and implications for research and practice are drawn.