Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism
Organization Science
An Empirical Analysis of Productivity and Quality in Software Products
Management Science
Coordinating Expertise in Software Development Teams
Management Science
Portfolios of Control in Outsourced Software Development Projects
Information Systems Research
Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis
Management Science
IT Outsourcing Success: A Psychological Contract Perspective
Information Systems Research
Deploying Common Systems Globally: The Dynamics of Control
Information Systems Research
Journal of Management Information Systems
The Matrix of Control: Combining Process and Structure Approaches to Managing Software Development
Journal of Management Information Systems
Expertise Integration and Creativity in Information Systems Development
Journal of Management Information Systems
Vendors' perspectives on trust and control in offshore information systems outsourcing
Information and Management
Predictors of Formal Control Usage in IT Outsourcing Partnerships
Information Systems Research
Governance-Knowledge Fit in Systems Development Projects
Information Systems Research
A Control Theory Perspective on Agile Methodology Use and Changing User Requirements
Information Systems Research
Control in Internal and Outsourced Software Projects
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contractual Provisions to Mitigate Holdup: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing
Information Systems Research
Complementarities Between Organizational IT Architecture and Governance Structure
Information Systems Research
Managers' Judgments of Performance in IT Services Outsourcing
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Although control theory has often been invoked to explain the coordination between client and vendor for information systems development ISD, insights into its moderating effects for explicating ISD contract performance, especially in the offshore context, is rather limited. Such insights would enable better understanding of variables that have complementary or substitutive effects on performance. Further, the control literature talks about different control modes e.g., formal and informal control modes classified as behavior, outcome, clan, and self-control modes without adequately distinguishing among the different control mechanisms enacting each of the control modes. In this research, by explicitly classifying the distinctions that exist within each of the control modes, we uncover the key role played by mechanistic governance in outsourced ISD. Grounding our arguments in the information requirement for performance evaluation, the study theorizes the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity and relational governance with ISD quality and cost performance. We test the theorized model in a field study comprising 160 offshore ISD projects executed by Indian vendors. Our results establish the significant complementary role of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity with both cost and quality performance variables. Further, mechanistic governance substitutes the impact of relational governance on cost performance. Thus, the study theoretically as well as empirically establishes the need for conceptualizing mechanistic governance as a viable and significant governance mechanism for offshore ISD contracts. The study also teases out the distinctions between the two prime contract types in vogue for managing offshore ISD contracts, namely, fixed price and time and materials contracts. The study thus contributes not only to control theory but also to the stream of literature examining offshore ISD contracts. Further, the study provides insights to managers on having well-specified contracts and acknowledging the role of mechanistic governance for better performance.