Contracting for software development
Management Science
Information and Organizations
Software Engineering Economics
Software Engineering Economics
Software Project Duration and Effort: An Empirical Study
Information Technology and Management
Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis
Management Science
Grasping the complexity of IS development projects
Communications of the ACM - New architectures for financial services
IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Explanations of Success
Information Systems Research
IT Outsourcing Success: A Psychological Contract Perspective
Information Systems Research
IT Outsourcing Contracts and Performance Measurement
Information Systems Research
Contract renegotiation and bargaining power: evidence from IT-related outsourcing agreements
Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Contract Performance in Offshore Systems Development: Role of Control Mechanisms
Journal of Management Information Systems
Knowledge based transactions and decision framing in Information Technology Outsourcing
The Journal of Strategic Information Systems
Cost escalation in information technology outsourcing: A moderated mediation study
Decision Support Systems
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The complexity and scope of outsourced information technology (IT) demands relationship-specific investments from vendors, which, when combined with contract incompleteness, may result in underinvestment and inefficient bargaining, referred to as the holdup problem. Using a unique data set of over 100 IT outsourcing contracts, we examine whether contract extensiveness, i.e., the extent to which firms and vendors can foresee contingencies when designing contracts for outsourced IT services, can alleviate holdup. While extensively detailed contracts are likely to include a greater breadth of activities outsourced to a vendor, task complexity makes it difficult to draft extensive contracts. Furthermore, extensive contracts may still be incomplete with respect to enforcement. We then examine the role of nonprice contractual provisions, contract duration, and extendibility terms, which give firms an option to extend the contract to limit the likelihood of holdup. We also validate the ex post efficiency of contract design choices by examining renewals of contracting agreements.