Contracting for software development
Management Science
Incomplete contracting issues in information systems development outsourcing
Decision Support Systems
Management Science - Special issue: Frontier research on information systems and economics
Performance Measurement and Design in Supply Chains
Management Science
Software development outsourcing contract: structure and business value
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Realizing value from information technology investment
Information Systems Outsourcing by Large American Industrial Firms: Choices and Impacts
Information Resources Management Journal
A Transaction Cost Perspective of the "Software as a Service" Business Model
Journal of Management Information Systems
An Empirical Analysis of Contract Structures in IT Outsourcing
Information Systems Research
Control in Internal and Outsourced Software Projects
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contractual Provisions to Mitigate Holdup: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing
Information Systems Research
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contract renegotiation and bargaining power: evidence from IT-related outsourcing agreements
Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management
Hybrid Relational-Contractual Governance for Business Process Outsourcing
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contract Performance in Offshore Systems Development: Role of Control Mechanisms
Journal of Management Information Systems
Cost escalation in information technology outsourcing: A moderated mediation study
Decision Support Systems
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Using an unusually comprehensive database on 858 transactions for information technology products and accompanying services, we study how close partners who are exposed to opportunistic hazards structure and control a significant transaction. We analyze data on the terms of contracting to determine whether transaction and supplier characteristics that generate opportunistic hazards are related to the formal management control structure. We also examine whether misalignment between transaction and supplier characteristics and the control structure is associated with ex post performance problems. Characteristics associated with hazards are found to be positively related to contract extensiveness. Factor analysis of the use of 24 contract terms reveals four groups of contract terms that are commonly used in combination. We interpret these factors as "dimensions of management control" and label them: assignment of rights, product and price, after-sales service, and legal recourse. Characteristics associated with hazards are positively related to the use of all four dimensions of management control, with different hazards associated with different controls. We then examine the relation between transaction characteristics and ex post transaction problems, demonstrating that even in the presence of mutually agreeable contracts, hazards remain. We conclude that costs of contracting are associated with increased use of contract terms on assignment of rights, after-sales service, and legal recourse. Finally, we present evidence that management control structures that are better aligned with transaction hazards mitigate subsequent performance problems, though at a nontrivial cost of contracting.