A skeptical theory of inheritance in nonmonotonic semantic networks
Artificial Intelligence
A translation approach to portable ontology specifications
Knowledge Acquisition - Special issue: Current issues in knowledge modeling
The split-up system: integrating neural networks and rule-based reasoning in the legal domain
ICAIL '95 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for how to Build a Person
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Modeling Legal Arguments: Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals
Modeling Legal Arguments: Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals
A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on AI and law
Predicting outcomes of case based legal arguments
ICAIL '03 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof
Artificial Intelligence
An Ontological Approach for the Management of Rights Data Dictionaries
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An OWL Ontology of Fundamental Legal Concepts
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2006: The Nineteenth Annual Conference
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Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law
Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law
Law and the Semantic Web: legal Ontologies, Methodologies, Legal Information Retrieval, and Applications
AICOL-I/IVR-XXIV'09 Proceedings of the 2009 international conference on AI approaches to the complexity of legal systems: complex systems, the semantic web, ontologies, argumentation, and dialogue
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Artificial Intelligence and Law
LegalRuleML: XML-based rules and norms
RuleML'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Rule-based modeling and computing on the semantic web
Ontology framework for judgment modelling
AICOL'11 Proceedings of the 25th IVR Congress conference on AI Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems: models and ethical challenges for legal systems, legal language and legal ontologies, argumentation and software agents
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
Modeling teleological interpretation
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
Classical antiquity and semantic content management on linked open data
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Collaborative Annotations in Shared Environment: metadata, vocabularies and techniques in the Digital Humanities
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I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept's applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept's constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross will be connected to the views on theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Consequently, the mere comprehension of a legal concept will be distinguished from the application of the concept to a particular legal system, since application presupposes a doctrinal commitment, namely, the belief that the inferences constituting the concept hold in that system. Then, I shall consider how concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology. Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts.