SecureME: a hardware-software approach to full system security

  • Authors:

  • Siddhartha Chhabra;Brian Rogers;Yan Solihin;Milos Prvulovic

  • Affiliations:

  • North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA;North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA;North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the international conference on Supercomputing
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

With computing increasingly becoming more dispersed, relying on mobile devices, distributed computing, cloud computing, etc. there is an increasing threat from adversaries obtaining physical access to some of the computer systems through theft or security breaches. With such an untrusted computing node, a key challenge is how to provide secure computing environment where we provide privacy and integrity for data and code of the application. We propose SecureME, a hardware-software mechanism that provides such a secure computing environment. SecureME protects an application from hardware attacks by using a secure processor substrate, and also from the Operating System (OS) through memory cloaking, permission paging, and system call protection. Memory cloaking hides data from the OS but allows the OS to perform regular virtual memory management functions, such as page initialization, copying, and swapping. Permission paging extends the OS paging mechanism to provide a secure way for two applications to establish shared pages for inter-process communication. Finally, system call protection applies spatio-temporal protection for arguments that are passed between the application and the OS. Based on our performance evaluation using microbenchmarks, single-program workloads, and multiprogrammed workloads, we found that SecureME only adds a small execution time overhead compared to a fully unprotected system. Roughly half of the overheads are contributed by the secure processor substrate. SecureME also incurs a negligible additional storage overhead over the secure processor substrate.