The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
The Design of Rijndael
Watermarking, tamper-proffing, and obfuscation: tools for software protection
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Efficient Software Implementation of AES on 32-Bit Platforms
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Nondeterministic Multithreading
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Efficient use of random delays in embedded software
WISTP'07 Proceedings of the 1st IFIP TC6 /WG8.8 /WG11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart cards, mobile and ubiquitous computing systems
i-hop homomorphic encryption and rerandomizable Yao circuits
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Misleading malware similarities analysis by automatic data structure obfuscation
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
An AES smart card implementation resistant to power analysis attacks
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Can a program reverse-engineer itself?
IMACC'11 Proceedings of the 13th IMA international conference on Cryptography and Coding
Shuffling against side-channel attacks: a comprehensive study with cautionary note
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code F and its input x. In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code Fi before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs F0, F1, . . . such that for all inputs x and for all indexes i ≠ j ⇒ Fi(x) = Fj(x) and Fi ne; Fj . This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.