The Influence of Social Dependencies on Decision-Making: Initial Investigations with a New Game
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An empirical study of interest-based negotiation
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An agent architecture for multi-attribute negotiation using incomplete preference information
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Opponent modelling in automated multi-issue negotiation using Bayesian learning
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Facing the challenge of human-agent negotiations via effective general opponent modeling
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Altruism and agents: an argumentation based approach to designing agent decision mechanisms
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Modeling reciprocal behavior in human bilateral negotiation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Can automated agents proficiently negotiate with humans?
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Agents that negotiate proficiently with people
SBP'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Social computing, behavioral-cultural modeling and prediction
Giving advice to people in path selection problems
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Adaptive negotiating agents in dynamic games: outperforming human behavior in diverse societies
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Revelation games are bilateral bargaining games in which agents may choose to truthfully reveal their private information before engaging in multiple rounds of negotiation. They are analogous to real-world situations in which people need to decide whether to disclose information such as medical records or university transcripts when negotiating over health plans and business transactions. This paper presents an agent-design that is able to negotiate proficiently with people in a revelation game with different dependencies that hold between players. The agent modeled the social factors that affect the players' revelation decisions on people's negotiation behavior. It was empirically shown to outperform people in empirical evaluations as well as agents playing equilibrium strategies. It was also more likely to reach agreement than people or equilibrium agents.