CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Run-Time Monitoring of Timing Constraints
RTAS '97 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Real-Time Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS '97)
Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking
ASPLOS XI Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks and Countermeasures
IEEE Design & Test
Compatibility is not transparency: VMM detection myths and realities
HOTOS'07 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX workshop on Hot topics in operating systems
Behavioral detection of malware on mobile handsets
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
On the Limits of Information Flow Techniques for Malware Analysis and Containment
DIMVA '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Hardware Trojan Detection and Isolation Using Current Integration and Localized Current Analysis
DFT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance of VLSI Systems
Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Secure in-VM monitoring using hardware virtualization
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Power fingerprinting in SDR & CR integrity assessment
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Finding collisions in the full SHA-1
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Software-Defined Radio (SDR) provides a flexible platform that facilitates radio resource management and enables new technologies and applications. Unfortunately, their reliance on software implementations makes them vulnerable to malicious software attacks that could impact their spectral emissions and disclose sensitive information. It is of critical importance for the widespread deployment of SDR to develop technologies that enable effective integrity assessment of communications platforms and timely detection of malicious intrusions. We provide further evidence of the feasibility of a novel approach called Power Fingerprinting (PFP) that enables an effective mechanism to perform integrity assessment of SDR. PFP relies on an external monitor that captures fine-grained measurements of the processor's power consumption and compares them against stored signatures from trusted software by applying pattern recognition and signal detection techniques. Because it is implemented by an external monitor, PFP causes minimal disruption on the target system and also provides the necessary isolation to protect against malicious attacks to the monitor itself. Fine-granularity measurements deliver improved visibility into the execution status and make the PFP monitor difficult to evade, while the reliance on anomaly detection from trusted references makes it effective against zero-day attacks. We present the results of different feasibility experiments that support the applicability of PFP to SDR integrity assessment. In the first experiment, a PFP monitor is able to effectively detect the execution of a tampered routine that misconfigures the operational mode of a PICDEM Z radio platform, affecting the resulting spectral emission. In a second experiment, our monitor effectively identifies when a transmission routine is modified, affecting encryption settings. We also present an approach to improve the performance of PFP by characterizing the way a specific platform consumes power. This platform characterization, which can be done using principal component analysis or linear discriminant analysis, allows a PFP monitor to work only on the features that carry the most information. As a result, the PFP monitor is able to detect execution deviations resulting from a difference of a single bit transition, the smallest possible disruption.