Pricing computer services: queueing effects
Communications of the ACM
Economies of scale in computing: Grosch's law revisited
Communications of the ACM
A strategic analysis of electronic marketplaces
MIS Quarterly - Special issue on the strategic use of information systems
Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Value of Information in Capacitated Supply Chains
Management Science
Microeconomics and the Market for Computer Services
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Optimal pricing policies of web-enabled application services
Decision Support Systems
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN COMPUTER USE; INITIAL TEST AND IMPLICATION A FOR THE COMPUTER UTILITY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN COMPUTER USE; INITIAL TEST AND IMPLICATION A FOR THE COMPUTER UTILITY
Information Flows in Capacitated Supply Chains with Fixed Ordering Costs
Management Science
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Management Science
Channel Performance Under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing
Management Science
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Strategic and competitive information systems
Buyer's Efficient E-Sourcing Structure: Centralize or Decentralize?
Journal of Management Information Systems
An Interdisciplinary Perspective on IT Services Management and Service Science
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems and e-Business Management
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The computing industry is gradually evolving to cater to the demand for software-as-a-service (SaaS). Two core competencies that have emerged over the past few years are that of the application service providers (ASPs) and the application infrastructure providers (AIPs). The arrangements between them result in system dynamics that is typical in supply chain networks. We examine the performance of an SaaS set up under different coordination strategies between these two players. Our analysis indicates that coordination between the monopoly ASP and the AIP can result in an outcome with the same overall surplus as can be achieved by a central planner. Even though the players have an incentive to deviate, it is possible to create the right incentives so that the economically efficient outcome is also the Nash equilibrium. The results of the analysis have significant implications for the coordination strategies for providers in the burgeoning business model of delivering software services over the Internet.