MTD3L: a secure IC design methodology with reduced overhead

  • Authors:
  • Michael Linder;Jia Di;Scott C. Smith

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science and Computer Engineering Department, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas;Computer Science and Computer Engineering Department, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas;Electrical Engineering Department, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas

  • Venue:
  • ACMIN'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Automatic Control, Modelling & Simulation, and Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Microelectronics, Nanoelectronics, Optoelectronics
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

With the increasing use of portable devices containing secure information, side-channel attack (SCA) has become an important threat to hardware. Traditional circuit designs leave otherwise secure systems vulnerable due to the external characteristics of the circuits, rather than in the crypto algorithms themselves. These characteristics are exploitable because they can be easily measured and processed to giving an attacker insight into the device's secret data. Alternative design techniques such as dual-rail asynchronous logic are capable of alleviating this problem to some extent; but still leave exploitable weaknesses while inducing high overhead. Multi-Threshold Dual-spacer Dual-rail Delay-insensitive Logic (MTD3L), presented in this paper, guarantees the security against power-based SCAs by balancing switching activities between the two rails of each signal, while offering a significant reduction in overhead through the incorporation of Multi-Threshold CMOS power gating structure. The SCA mitigating effectiveness and efficiency of MTD3L have been demonstrated by the design and simulation of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cores.