Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
Maximum-lifetime routing: system optimization & game-theoretic perspectives
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Routing in outer space: fair traffic load in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
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Choosing routes such that the network lifetime is maximized in a wireless network with limited energy resources is a major routing problem in wireless multi-hop ad hoc networks. In this paper, we study the problem where participants are rationally selfish and non-cooperative. By selfish we designate the users who are ready to tamper with their source-routing senders could choose intermediate nodes in the routing paths or next hop selection strategies in order to increase the total number of packets transmitted, but do not try to harm or drop packets of the other nodes. The problem therefore amounts to a non-cooperative game. In the works [2,6,19,23], the authors show that the game admits Nash equilibria [1]. Along this line, we first show that if the cost function is linear, this game has pure-strategy equilibrium flow even though participants have different demands. However, finding a Nash equilibrium for a normal game is computationally hard [9]. In this work, inspired by mixed-strategy equilibrium, we propose a simple local routing algorithm called MIxed Path Routing protocol MiPR. Using analysis and simulations, we show that MiPR drives the system to an equilibrium state where selfish participants do not have incentive to deviate. Moreover, MiPR significantly improves the network lifetime as compared to original routing protocols.