Further Results and Considerations on Side Channel Attacks on RSA

  • Authors:
  • Vlastimil Klíma;Tomás Ros

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

This paper contains three parts. In the first part we present a new side channel attack on a plaintext encrypted by EME-OAEP PKCS#1 v.2.1. In contrast with Manger's attack, we attack that part of the plaintext, which is shielded by the OAEP method. In the second part we show that Bleichenbacher's and Manger's attack on the RSA encryption scheme PKCS#1 v.1.5 and EME-OAEP PKCS#1 v.2.1 can be converted to an attack on the RSA signature scheme with any message encoding (not only PKCS). In the third part we deploy a general idea of fault-based attacks on the RSA-KEM scheme and present two particular attacks as the examples. The result is the private key instead of the plaintext as with attacks on PKCS#1 v.1.5 and v.2.1. These attacks should highlight the fact that the RSA-KEM scheme is not an entirely universal solution to problems of RSAES-OAEP implementation and that even here the manner of implementation is significant.