ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Securing Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication against Side-Channel Attacks
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Preventing SPA/DPA in ECC Systems Using the Jacobi Form
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Universal Exponentiation Algorithm
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Protections against Differential Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Improved Elliptic Curve Multiplication Methods Resistant against Side Channel Attacks
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis of Cryptographic Schemes OK-ECDH and OK-ECDSA
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Breaking the liardet-smart randomized exponentiation algorithm
CARDIS'02 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference - Volume 5
Collision-Based Power Analysis of Modular Exponentiation Using Chosen-Message Pairs
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Random Order m-ary Exponentiation
ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
A random M-ary method based countermeasure against side channel attacks
ICCSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Computational science and its applications: PartII
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Fast elliptic curve arithmetic and improved weil pairing evaluation
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Simple backdoors for RSA key generation
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Generic side-channel countermeasures for reconfigurable devices
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
A tutorial on physical security and side-channel attacks
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
EM analysis of rijndael and ECC on a wireless java-based PDA
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Digit set randomization in elliptic curve cryptography
SAGA'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Stochastic Algorithms: foundations and applications
A novel circuit design methodology to reduce side channel leakage
SPACE'12 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering
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We propose three differential power analysis (DPA) countermeasures for securing the public key cryptosystems. All countermeasures are based on the window method, and can be used in both RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). By using the optimal countermeasure, performance penalty is small. In comparison with k-ary method, computation time of our countermeasure is only 105% in 1024-bit RSA and 119% in 160-bit ECC.