How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Toll Policies for Mitigating Hazardous Materials Transport Risk
Transportation Science
Teleshopping versus shopping: a multicriteria network equilibrium framework
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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Part I of a two-part series, this paper recites a parable and formulates a stochastic optimization model that determines optimal link tolls on a road network whose users' value of time is a random variable. The parable, introducing the problem, demonst rates the importance of the variability of the value of time. The model, cast as a variational inequality, becomes a specialized form of a bicriterion user-quilibrium traffic assignment. Its solution is a set of efficient tolls for all links in the network. These tolls induce an equilibrium traffic flow that is at once system-optimal and user-optimal-for all trips, regardless of their value of time. Part II develops a solution algorithm, gives examples, and provides performance statistics.