Origin authentication in interdomain routing

  • Authors:

  • Patrick McDaniel;William Aiello;Kevin Butler;John Ioannidis

  • Affiliations:

  • Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada;Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;Center for Computational Learning Systems, Columbia University, New York, NY

  • Venue:
  • Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Attacks against Internet routing are increasing in number and severity. Contributing greatly to these attacks is the absence of origin authentication; there is no way to validate claims of address ownership or location. The lack of such services not only enables attacks by malicious entities, but also indirectly allows seemingly inconsequential misconfigurations to disrupt large portions of the Internet. This paper considers the semantics, design, and costs of origin authentication in interdomain routing. We formalize the semantics of address delegation and use on the Internet, and develop and characterize original, broad classes of origin authentication proof systems. We estimate the address delegation graph representing the current use of IPv4 address space using available routing data. This effort reveals that current address delegation is dense and relatively static: as few as 16 entities perform 80% of the delegation on the Internet. We conclude by evaluating the proposed services via trace-based simulation, which demonstrates that the enhanced proof systems can significantly reduce resource costs associated with origin authentication.