Negotiation analysis: a characterization and review
Management Science
Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
Artificial Intelligence
Communications of the ACM
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Multicriteria Optimization
Protocols for Negotiating Complex Contracts
IEEE Intelligent Systems
An agent architecture for multi-attribute negotiation using incomplete preference information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Integrative negotiation among agents situated in organizations
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Rational agents, contract curves, and inefficient compromises
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Searching for fair joint gains in agent-based negotiation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Strategies for offer generation and relaxation in fuzzy constraint-based negotiation models
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Advances in Agent-mediated Automated Negotiations
A multi-choice offer strategy for bilateral multi-issue negotiations using modified DWM learning
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Negotiating flexible agreements by combining distributive and integrative negotiation
Intelligent Decision Technologies
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It is well established by conflict theorists and others that successful negotiation should incorporate "creating value" as well as "claiming value." Joint improvements that bring benefits to all parties can be realised by (i) identifying attributes that are not of direct conflict between the parties, (ii) tradeoffs on attributes that are valued differently by different parties, and (iii) searching for values within attributes that could bring more gains to one party while not incurring too much loss on the other party. In this paper we propose an approach for maximising joint gains in automated negotiations by formulating the negotiation problem as a multi-criteria decision making problem and taking advantage of several optimisation techniques introduced by operations researchers and conflict theorists. We use a mediator to protect the negotiating parties from unnecessary disclosure of information to their opponent, while also allowing an objective calculation of maximum joint gains. We separate out attributes that take a finite set of values (simple attributes) from those with continuous values, and we show that for simple attributes, the mediator can determine the Pareto-optimal values. In addition we show that if none of the simple attributes strongly dominates the other simple attributes, then truth telling is an equilibrium strategy for negotiators during the optimisation of simple attributes. We also describe an approach for improving joint gains on non-simple attributes, by moving the parties in a series of steps, towards the Pareto-optimal frontier.