Protocols for Negotiating Complex Contracts

  • Authors:
  • Mark Klein;Peyman Faratin;Hiroki Sayama;Yaneer Bar-Yam

  • Affiliations:
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology;Massachusetts Institute of Technology;University of Electro-Communications;New England Complex Systems Institute

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Intelligent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

Work to date on negotiation protocols has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and relatively small number of possible contracts. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple interdependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal outcomes for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.