Introduction to algorithms
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Choosing social laws for multi-agent systems: minimality and simplicity
Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computing the Banzhaf power index in network flow games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
Exploiting domain knowledge to improve norm synthesis
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Assignment problem in requirements driven agent collaboration and its implementation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Mechanisms for multi-level marketing
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Modeling in agent oriented internetware framework
Proceedings of the Second Asia-Pacific Symposium on Internetware
A framework for coalitional normative systems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Power indices such as the Banzhaf index were originally developed within voting theory in an attempt to rigorously characterise the influence that a voter is able to wield in a particular voting game. In this paper, we show how such power indices can be applied to understanding the relative importance of agents when we attempt to devise a coordination mechanism using the paradigm of social laws, or normative systems. Understanding how pivotal an agent is with respect to the success of a particular social law is of benefit when designing such social laws: we might typically aim to ensure that power is distributed evenly amongst the agents in a system, to avoid bottlenecks or single points of failure. After formally defining the framework and illustrating the role of power indices in it, we investigate the complexity of computing these indices, showing that the characteristic complexity result is #P-completeness. We then investigate cases where computing indices is computationally easy.