Securing Scan Control in Crypto Chips
Journal of Electronic Testing: Theory and Applications
Scan Based Side Channel Attacks on Stream Ciphers and Their Counter-Measures
INDOCRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Self-test techniques for crypto-devices
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
JTAG Security System Based on Credentials
Journal of Electronic Testing: Theory and Applications
Secure and testable scan design using extended de Bruijn graphs
Proceedings of the 2010 Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference
Scan-based attacks on linear feedback shift register based stream ciphers
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES)
Secure scan design using shift register equivalents against differential behavior attack
Proceedings of the 16th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference
Balanced Secure Scan: Partial Scan Approach for Secret Information Protection
Journal of Electronic Testing: Theory and Applications
A novel differential scan attack on advanced DFT structures
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES) - Special Section on Networks on Chip: Architecture, Tools, and Methodologies
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Scan-based design for test (DFT) is a powerful testing scheme, but it can be used to retrieve the secrets stored in a crypto chip, thus compromising its security. On one hand, sacrificing the security for testability by using a traditional scan-based DFT restricts its use in privacy sensitive applications. On the other hand, sacrificing the testability for security by abandoning the scan-based DFT hurts the product quality. The security of a crypto chip comes from the small secret key stored in a few registers, and the testability of a crypto chip comes from the data path and control path implementing the crypto algorithm. Based on this key observation, the authors propose a novel scan DFT architecture called secure scan that maintains the high test quality of traditional scan DFT without compromising the security. They used a hardware implementation of the advanced encryption standard to show that the traditional scan DFT scheme can compromise the secret key. They then showed that by using secure-scan DFT, neither the secret key nor the testability of the AES implementation is compromised