Reducing buyer search costs: implications for electronic marketplaces
Management Science - Special issue: Frontier research on information systems and economics
Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers
Management Science
Information Technology and Management
The roles of players and reputation: evidence from eBay online auctions
Decision Support Systems
Price competition in e-tailing under service and recognition differentiation
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Reducing internet auction fraud
Communications of the ACM - Web searching in a multilingual world
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Oligopolistic price competition and adverse price effect in online retailing markets
Decision Support Systems
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Revisiting feedback systems: Trust building in digital markets
Information and Management
Research Note---Online Price Dispersion: A Game-Theoretic Perspective and Empirical Evidence
Information Systems Research
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Motivated by the contradictory findings in literature regarding whether high-reputation sellers enjoy a price premium over low-reputation sellers, this paper examines the pricing strategies of sellers with different reputation levels. We find that a negative price premium effect (i.e., a high-reputation seller charges a lower price than a low-reputation seller) exists due to: (1) the presence of both informed and uninformed buyers, which makes sellers follow mixed pricing strategies. It is then possible for a high-reputation seller setting a lower price than a low-reputation seller. Moreover, when the proportion of informed buyers exceeds a certain threshold, the expected price of a high-reputation seller is even lower than that of a low-reputation seller; (2) the competition among the sellers, which reduces the high-reputation sellers' prices but increases the low-reputation sellers' prices. Consequently, a high-reputation seller is more likely to charge a lower price than a low-reputation seller when the competition intensifies. Our empirical findings also support our theoretical results on the negative price premium effect.