A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
System on Chip or System on Package?
IEEE Design & Test
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Multiplicative Masking and Power Analysis of AES
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Simplified Adaptive Multiplicative Masking for AES
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Energy-aware design techniques for differential power analysis protection
Proceedings of the 40th annual Design Automation Conference
Instruction Stream Mutation for Non-Deterministic Processors
ASAP '02 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Application-Specific Systems, Architectures, and Processors
Masking the Energy Behavior of DES Encryption
DATE '03 Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 1
A cryptography core tolerant to DFA fault attacks
SBCCI '06 Proceedings of the 19th annual symposium on Integrated circuits and systems design
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The physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak to some attacker security information by the side channel data, as power consumption, timing, temperature or electromagnetic emanation. The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a powerful side channel attack, based only on the power consumption information. There are some countermeasures proposed at algorithmic or architectural level that are expensive and/or complexes. This paper addresses the DPA attack problem by a novel and efficient transistor-level method based on a power consumption control, without any modification on the cryptographic algorithms, messages or keys.