A proposal for a new block encryption standard
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Computer Arithmetic Algorithms
Computer Arithmetic Algorithms
Fault-Secure Parity Prediction Booth Multipliers
IEEE Design & Test
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Fault-Based Side-Channel Cryptanalysis Tolerant Rijndael Symmetric Block Cipher Architecture
DFT '01 Proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault-Tolerance in VLSI Systems
Description of a New Variable-Length Key, 64-bit Block Cipher (Blowfish)
Fast Software Encryption, Cambridge Security Workshop
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Detecting and Locating Faults in VLSI Implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard
DFT '03 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems
Detecting Faults in Four Symmetric Key Block Ciphers
ASAP '04 Proceedings of the Application-Specific Systems, Architectures and Processors, 15th IEEE International Conference
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems in the Presence of Permanent and Transient Faults
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
DFT '05 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems
Designing Resistant Circuits against Malicious Faults Injection Using Asynchronous Logic
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Journal of Electronic Testing: Theory and Applications
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Invariance-based concurrent error detection for advanced encryption standard
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
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One of the most effective ways of attacking a cryptographic device is by deliberate fault injection during computation, which allows retrieving the secret key with a small number of attempts. Several attacks on symmetric and public-key cryptosystems have been described in the literature and some dedicated error-detection techniques have been proposed to foil them. The proposed techniques are ad hoc ones and exploit specific properties of the cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we propose a general framework for error detection in symmetric ciphers based on an operation-centered approach. We first enumerate the arithmetic and logic operations included in the cipher and analyze the efficacy and hardware complexity of several error-detecting codes for each such operation. We then recommend an error-detecting code for the cipher as a whole based on the operations it employs. We also deal with the trade-off between the frequency of checking for errors and the error coverage. We demonstrate our framework on a representative group of 11 symmetric ciphers. Our conclusions are supported by both analytical proofs and extensive simulation experiments.