Reintermediation strategies in business-to-business electronic commerce
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Electronic intermediaries and networks in business-to-business electronic commerce
Pricing and Product Design: Intermediary Strategies in an Electronic Market
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Journal of Management Information Systems
A Game-Theoretic Model of E-Marketplace Participation Growth
Journal of Management Information Systems
Network Effects and Technology Licensing with Fixed Fee, Royalty, and Hybrid Contracts
Journal of Management Information Systems
Analyzing Complementarities Using Software Stacks for Software Industry Acquisitions
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems Frontiers
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
Design and Ownership of Two-Sided Networks: Implications for Internet Platforms
Journal of Management Information Systems
The Complementary Effects of E-Markets on Existing Supplier-Buyer Relationships in a Supply Chain
Journal of Management Information Systems
Biased Listing in Electronic Marketplaces: Exploring Its Implications in On-Line Hotel Distribution
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Functionality-rich versus minimalist platforms: a two-sided market analysis
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Donor-to-Nonprofit Online Marketplace: An Economic Analysis of the Effects on Fund-Raising
Journal of Management Information Systems
Innovation and Price Competition in a Two-Sided Market
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce has become an important issue in the debate about electronic commerce. How should the intermediary charge suppliers and buyers to maximize profits from such a marketplace? We analyze a monopolistic B2B marketplace owned by an independent intermediary. The marketplace exhibits two-sided network effects where the value of the marketplace to buyers is dependent on the number of suppliers, and the value to suppliers is dependent on the number of buyers and suppliers. When these two-sided network effects exist, we find that the optimal price for buyers and the fraction of buyers in the electronic market are dependent on the switching cost and the strength of the network effect of both types: buyers and suppliers. The same is true for the optimal price for suppliers and the fraction of suppliers in the electronic market. In other words, the parameters that define the buyers also affect the optimal price for suppliers and the fraction of suppliers in the electronic market, and vice versa. Our results also point to some counterintuitive optimal pricing strategies that depend on the nature of the industry served by the marketplace.