Security analysis of logic obfuscation

Authors:
Jeyavijayan Rajendran;Youngok Pino;Ozgur Sinanoglu;Ramesh Karri
Affiliations:
Polytechnic Institute of New York University;Air Force Research Labs;New York University-Abu Dhabi;Polytechnic Institute of New York University
Venue:
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Due to globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow, rogue elements in the supply chain can pirate ICs, overbuild ICs, and insert hardware trojans. EPIC [1] obfuscates the design by randomly inserting additional gates; only a correct key makes the design to produce correct outputs. We demonstrate that an attacker can decipher the obfuscated netlist, in a time linear to the number of keys, by sensitizing the key values to the output. We then develop techniques to fix this vulnerability and make obfuscation truly exponential in the number of inserted keys.